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PRIVACY METRICS AND BOUNDARIES
ABSTRACT
This paper aims at defining a set of privacy metrics
(quantitative and qualitative) in the case of the
relation between a privacy protector ,and an
information gatherer .The aims with such metrics
are : -to allow to assess and compare different user
scenarios and their differences ;for examples of
scenarios see [4]; -to define a notion of privacy
boundary, and design it to encompass the set of
information , behaviours , actions and processes
which the privacy protector can accept to expose to
an information gathering under an agreement with
said party ; everything outside the boundary is not
acceptable and justifies not entering into the
agreement ; -to characterize the contribution of
privacy enhancing technologies (PET). A full case is
given with the qualitative and quantitative privacy
metrics determination and envelope, i.e. a Cisco Inc.
privacy agreement.
ACM Categories and classification
K4.1 [Societal aspects] Privacy
ACM General terms
Security, Economics
Keywords
Privacy, Metrics, Set theory, Economics, Case,
Privacy enhancing technologies
1. DEFINITIONS
The privacy protector is an individual , group or
organization defending consciously a set of
information , behaviours, values , processes and
methods in terms of the full control and
independence of these .This set is called the private
information set.
The information gatherer is an individual, group,
organization, machine or network , operating on the
privacy protector’s information set .However, in
special cases , the information gatherer may also be
“nature” that is the privacy protector’s own 
environment .
The information gathering operations may be:
-either the result of an explicit agreement between
the two above parties
-or the result of an implicit agreement between the
two above parties , as linked to another type of
agreement between them, such as a social or
business agreement
-or may take place without the privacy protector’s 
explicit or implicit acceptance
2. ORGANIZATIONAL AND SET
THEORETICAL ASPECTS
Because of information networking effects, in real
situations the privacy protector shares information
fully or in part with other privacy protectors, each of
those having different relations to information
collectors.
Likewise, because of information networking
effects, the information gatherer shares information
fully or in part with other information gatherers,
each of which having different relations to the
privacy protectors. It is assumed that all members of
the information collector can access and share freely
and equally the information gathered.
Because of organizational or decision hierarchies, a
given privacy protector may be exposed to
information gatherers at different levels, and vice
versa as well, with different nested or linked private
information sets.
The presentation below about privacy features is
limited to the relation between one privacy protector
and one information collector , although the nature
of each can be very different .Needles to say, this
relation is assymmetrical , meaning that the privacy
protector is also sometimes the information gatherer
, with two flows eventually existing and usually
quite different .
Each privacy protector has defined a private
information set, which nevertheless can be accessed
and can flow freely between its members .This
private information set is not restricted to static
information, or dynamic information, but includes
also process, sequence, tool and method
information.
The information collector achieves a measure of
success if it accesses (copy, transfer, delete,
substitute) an element in the private information set
of the privacy-collector, or achieves a change in the
privacy protector’s existence conditions (role,
identity, risk exposure, etc...) .
The privacy features listed below are not organized
by “vulnerabilities”. 
For a further formalism about the above,
information games, as well as information warfare,
offer useful frameworks.
This paper does NOT however take the approach of
a cost-benefit analysis or quantitative game between
the parties driven by their utility functions.
3. PRIVACY FEATURES
3.1. Copy feature
This feature exists in two instances:
-“Copy-quantitative” :how much information in the 
private information set is copied and available to the
information collector ;if several information
quantity measures exist, this feature exists for each
-“Copy-qualitative”: what is the relative value, on a
value scale ,of the private information copied and
available to the information collector ; if several
information value measures exist , this feature exists
for each .
Besides, the feature can be assessed by either the
privacy protector or the information collector; if
there is a gap, there may be loss or a third party
involved.
The different information types apply to a wide
range of moral, capability, information asset, and
other types.
3.2. Transfer, delete, and substitute
features:
They are defined as in 3. 1. ,except that the copy
process is replaced by the transfer , delete, substitute
processes to the benefit of the information collector
.If there is transfer, the information does not exist
any more in the private information set.
3.3. Role change feature
This qualitative feature “Role-qualitative” indicates
on a scale, how different the privacy protector’s role 
in his previous context, has changed as a result of
the information collection .Normally the scale go
from vastly diminished contributing role in this
context, to vastly enhanced .From the networking
point of view it can be approximated by the number
of links of influence or benefit this privacy protector
gets as a result of the information collection.
3.4. Identity change feature
This qualitative feature ”Identity-qualitative” 
indicates on a scale if the information collection has
destroyed or enhanced the visibility and
independence of the privacy collector in his
previous context as a result of the information
collection ; this includes personal preferences,
lifestyle, values being disclosed
3.5. Time feature
This quantitative feature “Time-quantitative” states 
the relative loss or gain of time of the privacy
protector in his main time-dependent actions and
their success, due to the information collection
taking place
3.6. Risk feature
This quantitative feature “Risk-quantitative” states 
the rate of reduction or increase of the privacy
protector in his main risk exposed actions and their
success, due to the information collection taking
place
3.7. Leaking feature
This quantitative feature “Leak-quantitative” defines 
the perceived probability, seen from the privacy
protector, which if there is information collection,
the information gathered will be copied to a third
party due to the information collector’s networking 
facilities.
4. PRIVACY ACCOUNTABILITY
This term encompasses the set and process based
protocols (in an information theoretic sense)
whereby the privacy features are tracked and later
negotiated .In quite many cases , the information
collector will grant the privacy protector some rights
,services or goods , against his agreeing to
disclosing some of the information in the private
information set ,plus some other compensation . In
many cases such a negotiation will operate on
Min(Max) or Max(Min) values with a
corresponding value logic, which works both on
qualitative as well as quantitative values.
Privacy assurance is then the set of processes and
physical measures taken by a privacy protector to
safeguard his private information set.
5. PRIVACY FEATURE VALUE
DISTRIBUTION
The assumption made here is that privacy is a
mental perception for which there exists
distributions of the extreme values , akin hazard and
risk assessment about technical systems .Extremes
of privacy features are perceived , from a human
perception point of view, as stress ,for which
bayesian priors may exist .The idea is to estimate
the probability that the privacy holder is strong
enough to overcome the information collection
stress .These distributions are also assumed to exist
over finite ranges ,although the end points may not
be defined or reproducible .It is also assumed that
the ranges have a sufficient granularity to allow for
qualitative or quantitative values to be assessed over
these ranges.
We do not make here any explicit assumptions such
as the fuzzy set membership functions used by
some approaches to risk and security using fuzzy
sets ,and the resulting possibility expected values
Likewise we do not specify or assume any structure
in the privacy feature hierarchy, such as the tree
based views in safety analysis (and fault trees) ; the
reason for this last assumption is that the different
privacy feature do not in general exhibit between
them causal relations which can be formalized in
this structured way .We do not either use formal
approaches to information semantics which could
eventually encapsulate privacy protector
understandings ,as this is very difficult to
characterize without proper knowledge
representation and knowledge acquisition [5].
We do acknowledge that privacy features in
different user scenario may be analyzed by Monte
Carlo simulation about the whole usage or
information collection simulation.
Thus, we conjecture here that the distribution of the
extreme values of the privacy features each obey as
a first approximation a probability distribution akin
many extremes [1,2,6 ] ,that is f(x) measures the
probability that the random feature value X is larger
than x :
f (x) =1- k * exp ( -a *exp(b*x))
where a , b , k are normalized constants ,and an
order relation for x values exist which give low
ranks to values favourable to the privacy protector,
and high values to those who are not .If order is
reverse, formula changes. The constants are
normalized so that f(x) is a true probability
distribution function, that is:
f(0) or f(low) =1
f(infinite) or f(max) = 0
where “low” and “max” are end values of 
qualitative ranges.
The above approximation is essentially non-
parametric as it does not assume parametric or
specific distributions of the feature values .Some
more complex wavelet based models exist which
require the estimation of more parameters, which
may be difficult to do in the context of this study.
If enough data can be collected , the stress-strength
models for reliability with non-parametric inference
from a learning sequence , can give confidence
bounds on the privacy features [3]; of course more
precise estimates can be obtained if a prior
distribution is assumed (Weibull, Poisson) and one
can also utilize the eventual covariances between
different privacy features (if known) .
Some prior research [7] has taken an information
theoretical approach to the same issue of defining
metrics on anonimity, but suffers from the need of
prior distributions of information sets for both the
privacy protector and the information gatherer.
6. PRIVACY ENVELOPE
We define now the privacy envelope as the set of
states of the privacy protector (and his privacy
assurance processes), which:
-either are inside tolerable values for the privacy
protector, set explicitely for each feature by a
privacy feature threshold value;
-or, correspond to one given probability p for all
privacy feature values x to be less than the
distribution of the extremes, such that p=f(x); in
this case p becomes a privacy tolerance measure
across all features.
7. COMPUTATION AN ANALYSIS
CASE
Appendix gives a full case with the full text of the
terms of a service level agreement (SLA) , for a
Privacy agreement proposed by Cisco to individuals
seeking access to a Cisco Web site (see Figure 1)
.The Appendix gives as well as an initial qualitative
grading by the PrivacyHolder of the privacy
attributes of this SLA. In this Section we give a full
computation of the privacy envelope following the
methodology and formulas of the previous Sections
.We also determine quantitatively privacy
equilibrium of the privacy features. Whereas the
qualitative grading showed that the initial
assessment of the Cisco SLA was actually quite
unfavourable for the PrivacyHolder, the
computation determines a better and more objective
equilibrium, thus reflecting PrivacyHolder’s 
“privacy risk aversion” .The graphical presentation
of the privacy envelope offers a visual way to show
how privacy metrics cluster in favourable or
unfavourable subsets to either party.
7.1. InformationGatherer (Cisco)
The InformationGatherer Cisco has three
component demand functions for the service they
supply commercially to third parties; the service
relies on information inputs from PrivacyHolders. In
general the demand is increasing with the quality of
the information Cisco collects from the
PrivacyHolders:
-demand grows exponentially, with a ceiling, vs.
copied information quantity from PrivacyHolder
-demand decreases exponentially, with a floor, vs.
role enhancement, visibility and support given to
PrivacyHolder
-demand grows exponentially, with a ceiling, vs.
leakage Cisco can make to third parties (includes
Cisco’s customers)
Cisco’s utility function is a linear weighted sum of
the above demand functions, and is to be
maximized. It is assumed that the pricing is fixed
and common for all customers of Cisco, thus
revenue is proportional to supplied demand.
7.2. PrivacyHolder
PrivacyHolder is in this case not a commercial
entity but owns know how and information assets,
plus an identity and social role. For reasons of
simplification, all PrivacyHolders are assumed to
behave identically.
The PrivacyHolder’s information asset reserves are 
tapped by copy, delete, and substitute functions
enabled under an SLA with Cisco, but are also
accrued over time by the role enhancement of the
PrivacyHolder which the SLA enables.
The information asset reserves of PrivacyHolder are
a weighted linear combination of the past reserves,
accrued (with the right signs) for transfer, delete ,
substitution and future role driven enhancements
.The copy function does not deplete these assets .In
the weights the maximum capacities allowed under
the SLA are taken into account.
The utility for PrivacyHolder of his entering into an
agreement with Cisco is proportionate to his
information assets (which can be supplied in total or
usually in parts) ,multiplied by the privacy utility of
this supply , as measured by the privacy metrics
distribution taken from the point of view of the
PrivacyHolder (see Section 5 ) .However, as the
PrivacyHolder is not acting for revenue
maximisation but for privacy protection ,the privacy
utility of this supply across all privacy metrics
should be the largest (or eventually the median ) ,but
certainly not the smallest .
PrivacyHolder’s utility function does not include in 
this case a price based component as the supply is
on a free voluntary basis.
7.3. Privacy equilibrium
The determination or computation of the final
equilibrium SLA driven privacy attribute values
should result from a fair equilibrium between
Cisco’s utility function, and PrivacyHolder’s utility 
function. The equilibrium should be computed
across all privacy metric variables set by the
PrivacyHolder (in this case: 13 see Table 1) .All
these variables are to be determined within the
bounds (upper and lower) on each attribute.
For lack of access to a MaxMin computation
software with constraints, is computed here the
minimum of the squared difference between the
utility function values of Cisco and of the
PrivacyHolder, subject to the set constraints on all
privacy metric attribute values.
7.4. Privacy envelope
For each set of privacy attributes , is computed and
visualized in a radial “star” form the computed 
thirteen privacy metrics using the formula in Section
5 (Figure 2)  .The formula’s parameters are however 
estimated and adjusted for computability.
Figure 1: SLA and usage of information gathered
Privacy enveloppe:
Cisco case
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
78
9
10
11
12
13
Figure 2: Privacy envelope (Cisco case)
8. CONCLUSION, CRITICISM
AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
The formalism above assumes all privacy metrics to
be calibrated or defined in terms of prior values or
probabilities corresponding to an operating context
Privacy
Holder
Cisco Cisco
customersPrivacy
SLA
Commercial
contract
Other Privacy Holders
preceding the information collector’s operations 
.This makes indeed absolute comparisons almost
impossible, although the privacy envelopes
determined by the same perceived p values may
allow for comparison.
On the other hand, most humans and organizations
do perceive stress in terms of reference frameworks
which are subjective. Consequently, any case must
specify the initial assumptions made.
The privacy ranges, and envelope, are of huge
importance when implementing service level
agreements (SLA’s, defined in the Open Group’s 
SLA Handbook) between the privacy protector and
the information collector .This envelope, the
thresholds, or the probability p, may be used in the
SLA attributes to be negotiated. The economic
impact of these privacy features has been researched
in a companion report in the PRIME project which
implements privacy SLA’s with economic contract 
values.
Finally , this paper recognizes that privacy SLA’s 
business value does not extend to all domains, while
conversely there are application domains where
their introduction would be a major incentive
scheme to unleash controlled information and
business interactions . To difficult areas belong
health privacy (see e.g. EU IS/T project PRIDEH-
GEN) ,and some security information. To the
realistic areas belong telecommunications and
mobile services, transport , information services ,
and logistics ; some calculation cases and even
implementations are underway in some of these last
areas .
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APPENDIX : A CASE : CISCO’s 
PRIVACY POLICY
This is an illustration of the values a privacy
protector exposed to this “privacy policy” could set , 
facing the information collection process by Cisco
which this protector may have agreed to if he has
agreed upon the terms of this service level
agreement (SLA)(Tables 1 and 2) .The text of the
Cisco policy is reproduced below ((C) Cisco Inc)
(Table 3)
In the qualitative attribute range, “Average”/”Same”  
stands for the conditions existing prior to entering
into an agreement .In the quantitative attribute
range, values depend on individual’s client 
configuration .
The distributions of extremes is not reported here
,although it can easily be derived from the privacy
feature values (and range specifications ) below- A
simple colour coding approximation has been done,
that is :
-orange:if privacy feature value is at threshold for
privacy protector
-green : ””””””””””””””””””””” is better than 
threshold “””””””””””
-red : “”””””””””””””””””””””” exceeds threshold 
“”””””””””””””””
It can be seen that ,by and large, and yet to be
confirmed by a single aggregate probability of
reaching extreme, the relationship between the
privacy protector and the information collector
formalized by the agreement underneath, is not
favourable to privacy protector .
Table 1 : INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS AND
PRIOR’s
CONTEXT PRIVACY
PROTECTOR
INFORMATION
GATHERER
Identity Individual in
his work
environment
and for his
learning
Cisco
Explicit
agreement
Individual
releases some
basic
Cisco collects
information about
individual and his
information on
identity,roles,
responsibilities
information
needs, IT
system, use of
Cisco systems ,
against promise
by Cisco to
send a
newsletter and
give access to a
Cisco product
site via a
login/password
professional
needs and
environment, as
well as about the
Web traffic
generated by
individual
Implicit
agreement
Cisco may have
an agreement
with
individual’s 
employer or IT
systems
platform
operator
Cisco has
agreements with
unnamed third
parties
Non
authorized
agreement
N/A N/A
TABLE 2: Privacy feature ranges , thresholds and values for Case (Privacy protector’s view) 
PRIVACY
FEATURE
RANGE/UNITS ORDER
(Increased
risk/Diminishing
risk)
VALUE THRESHOLD VALUE vs.
THRESHOLD
Copy-
quantitative
0-100 MB I 10 k 30 k
Copy-
qualitative
Useless-Minor-Average-
Critical(individual)-
Business critical(
employer)
I Critical
(individual)
Average (no
anonymous
browsing
possible)
Transfer-
quantitative
0-100 MB I 0 0
Transfer-
qualitative
Useless-Minor-Average-
Major-Business
critical(individual)-
Business critical(
employer)
I Major , due to
unspecified
nature of cookies
and attached
trojan horses, and
unspecified use
Average
of log files
Delete-
quantitative
0-100 MB I 0 0
Delete-
qualitative
Useless-Minor-Average-
Major-Business
critical(individual)-
Business critical(
employer)
I Average Average
Substitute-
quantitative
0-100 MB I 10 MB
downloadable
information files
or executable
files; no
protection against
disruptions
0
Substitute-
qualitative
Useless-Minor-Average-
Major-Business
critical(individual)-
Business critical(
employer)
I Business
critical(employer)
Average
Role change Much reduced-Reduced-
Same-Enhanced-Much
enhanced/new role
D Same as
individual’s 
contributions are
not recognized by
Cisco
Enhanced
Identity change Destroyed-reduced-Same-
Enhanced-Significantly
strengthened
D Reduced, as
personal usage
and preferences
are disclosed and
logged ,to access
any self-selected
information
Same
Time Blocked-Reduced-Same-
Enhanced-Competitive
advantage
D Enhanced, due to
timely access to
information
maybe not
available
otherwise
Enhanced
Risk Significantly larger-
Larger-Same-Reduced-
Significantly less
D Reduced Reduced
Leakage Reduced-Same-Increased-
Major leakage
I Increased , due to
Cisco controlled
transfer to
partners and
others ,as well as
unspecified data
content of
cookies
Same
Privacy Statement
Table 3 : CITATION (C) Cisco Inc
Cisco Systems, Inc. Online Privacy Statement
Cisco respects your privacy and is committed to
protect the personal information that you share with
us. Generally, you can browse through our website
without giving us any information about yourself.
When we do need your personal information to
provide services that you request or when you
choose to provide us with your personal
information, this policy describes how we collect
and use your personal information.
Information Collection
Personal information means any information that
may be used to identify an individual, including,
but not limited to, a first and last name, email
address, a home, postal or other physical address,
other contact information, title, birth date, gender,
occupation, industry, personal interests, and other
information when needed to provide a service you
requested.
When you browse our website, you do so
anonymously, unless you have previously indicated
that you wish Cisco to remember your login and
password. We don't automatically collect personal
information, including your email address. We do
log your IP address (the Internet address of your
computer) to give us an idea of which part of our
website you visit and how long you spend there.
But we do not link your IP address to any personal
information unless you have logged in to our
website. Like many other commercial websites, the
Cisco website may use a standard technology
called a "cookie" to collect information about how
you use the site. Please go to "Cookies and
Tracking Information" below for more information.
Cisco collects personal information when you
register with Cisco for a Cisco account, when you
use certain Cisco products or services, when you
register to attend a seminar or participate in an
online survey, when you ask to be included in an
email or other mailing list, or you submit an entry
for a sweepstakes or other promotions, or when you
submit your personal information to Cisco for any
other reason. From time to time, Cisco receives
personal information from business partners and
vendors. Cisco only uses such information if it has
been collected in accordance with acceptable
privacy practices consistent with this Policy and
applicable laws.
Access to certain Cisco web pages require a login
and a password. The use of those web pages, and
the information or programs downloadable from
those sites, may be governed by a written
agreement between your employer and Cisco.
Unless you request deletion of your personal
information as specified below, your personal
information may be retained by Cisco to verify
compliance with the agreement, log software
licenses granted, to track software downloaded
from those pages, or track usage of other
applications available on those pages.
Notice
When personal information is collected, we will
inform you at the point of collection the purpose
for the collection. Cisco will not transfer your
personal information to third parties without your
consent, except under the limited conditions
described under the discussion entitled
"Information Sharing and Disclosure" below.
If you choose to provide us with your personal
information, we may only transfer that
information, within Cisco or to Cisco's third
party service providers with your permission.
Upon receiving your permission, we may
transfer your information across borders and
from your country or jurisdiction to other
countries or jurisdictions around the world.
We will always give you the opportunity to "opt
out" of receiving direct marketing or market
research information. This means we assume you
have given us your consent to collect and use your
information in accordance with this Policy unless
you take affirmative action to indicate that you do
not consent, for instance by clicking or checking
the appropriate option or box at the point of
collection. In some cases, when applicable, we will
provide you with the opportunity to "opt in." This
means we will require your affirmative action to
indicate your consent before we use your
information for purposes other than the purpose for
which it was submitted.
Cookies and Tracking Technology
A cookie is a small data file that certain Web sites
write to your hard drive when you visit them. A
cookie file can contain information such as a user
ID that the site uses to track the pages you've
visited, but the only personal information a cookie
can contain is information you supply yourself. A
cookie can't read data off your hard disk or read
cookie files created by other sites. Some parts of
Cisco's website use cookies to track user traffic
patterns. We do this in order to determine the
usefulness of our website information to our users
and to see how effective our navigational structure
is in helping users reach that information.
If you prefer not to receive cookies while browsing
our website, you can set your browser to warn you
before accepting cookies and refuse the cookie
when your browser alerts you to its presence. You
can also refuse all cookies by turning them off in
your browser, although you may not be able to take
full advantage of Cisco's website if you do so. In
particular, you may be required to accept cookies in
order to complete certain actions on our website.
You do not need to have cookies turned on,
however, to use/navigate through many parts of our
website, except access to certain of Cisco's web
pages may require a login and password.
How We Use Information Collected
Cisco uses information for several general
purposes: to fulfill your requests for certain
products and services, to personalize your
experience on our website, to keep you up to date
on the latest product announcements, software
updates, special offers or other information we
think you'd like to hear about either from us or
from our business partners, and to better
understand your needs and provide you with better
services. We may also use your information to send
you, or to have our business partners send you,
direct marketing information or contact you for
market research.
Information Sharing and Disclosure
Because Cisco is a global company, your personal
information may be shared with other Cisco offices
or subsidiaries around the world. All such entities
are governed by this Privacy Policy or are bound
by the appropriate confidentiality and data transfer
agreements.
Your personal information is never shared outside
Cisco without your permission, except under
conditions explained below. Inside Cisco, data is
stored in controlled servers with limited access.
Your information may be stored and processed in
the United States or any other country where Cisco,
its subsidiaries, affiliates or agents are located.
Cisco may send your personal information to other
companies or people under any of the following
circumstances: when we have your consent to share
the information; we need to share your information
to provide the product or service you have
requested; we need to send the information to
companies who work on behalf of Cisco to provide
a product or service to you (we will only provide
those companies the information they need to
deliver the service, and they are prohibited from
using that information for any other purpose); or
we want to keep you up to date on the latest
product announcements, software updates, special
offers or other information we think you'd like to
hear about either from us or from our business
partners (unless you have opted out of these types
of communications). We will also disclose your
personal information if required to do so by law, to
enforce our Terms of Use, or in urgent
circumstances, to protect personal safety, the public
or our websites.
Your Ability to Review and Delete Your Account
and Information
If you are a registered CCO user, you can review
your personal information by accessing
http://tools.cisco.com/RPF/profile/profile_manage
ment.do. You may also request deletion of your
Cisco account or any of your personal information
held by us by sending an email to
privacy@cisco.com.
Data Security
Your Cisco account information is password-
protected for your privacy and security. Cisco
safeguards the security of the data you send us with
physical, electronic, and managerial procedures. In
certain areas of our websites, Cisco uses industry-
standard SSL-encryption to enhance the security of
data transmissions. While we strive to protect your
personal information, we cannot ensure the security
of the information you transmit to us, and so we
urge you to take every precaution to protect your
personal data when you are on the Internet. Change
your passwords often, use a combination of letters
and numbers, and make sure you use a secure
browser.
Questions or Suggestions
If you have questions or concerns about our
collection, use, or disclosure of your personal
information, please email us at privacy@cisco.com.
